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Biology, The Empathic Science: Husserl’s Beilage XXIII  
of Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine 
Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie1 
 
Darian Meacham 
Thanks to Niall Keane’s careful translation, English-speaking readers of Husserl 
have a first chance to read this important appendix to the Krisis text, omitted from the 
original English translation of 1970.2 The translation of Beilage XXIII also offers a rare 
glimpse at a dimension of Husserl’s late thought that seldom gets seen in English, but 
which nonetheless left an important legacy in the development of phenomenology. This 
is particularly the case with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but also, perhaps more indirectly, 
the phenomenological biology of Hans Jonas and contemporary work in the field of 
neurophenomenology and philosophy of mind (I am thinking here of Evan Thompson’s 
Mind in Life).3 While Thompson’s work draws explicitly on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and 
Jonas, he does not (to my knowledge) anywhere mention Husserl’s few writings on 
biology. I will briefly return to Jonas and Thompson later to argue that one of the central 
insights that Thompson draws from Jonas: “life can only be known by life”, is already 
very much present in Husserl’s ideas as presented in this appendix.4 Though these few 
pages offer only some hints at what Husserl thought the relation between biology and 
phenomenology might be, and beyond that what light the relation between biological life 
and consciousness or sense-bestowal (Sinngebungen) might shed on more general 
ontological problems, they present an interesting set of issues that continue to be of 
relevance today in several areas of philosophy (phenomenology, philosophy of mind, 
philosophy of life, philosophy of biology, philosophy of nature).  
 
The significance of this and other unpublished texts on biology and nature from 
Husserl’s late period certainly was not lost on Merleau-Ponty. To paraphrase the French 
phenomenologist, it is in these late, unpublished and ‘embarrassing’ writings (the 
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unpublished Beilagen, notes and manuscripts some of which Merleau-Ponty was able to 
consult at the Husserl Archives as early as 1939, including Ideas II) that Husserl provides 
some of the resources for putting the absolute being of the transcendental subject into 
question and with it the assertion that its constituting activities would be the ground of 
all phenomenology.5 But all of this is done from within the limits of phenomenology and 
indeed from within the framework of transcendental idealism and its emphasis on the 
sense-bestowing activities of the ego. It is this possibility of going beyond egoic 
transcendental idealism, what Merleau-Ponty calls bringing into contact with one another 
the “realist-causal order” and the “idealist-constituting” one,6 that led the French 
phenomenologist to translate (into French) Beilage XXIII in the preparation of his 1958-
59 course La philosophie aujourd’hui, where he read (or at least, according to his notes, 
planned to) the appendix with his students.7 It is clear that he saw Husserl’s late and 
‘embarrassing’ (at least from the perspective of phenomenological transcendental 
idealism grounded in the absoluteness of the constituting subject) writings as offering 
vital clues, hints and resources towards the aim of his (Merleau-Ponty’s) final project: 
“Unconcealment of a type of being other than the one where what we call ‘matter,’ ‘spirit,’ 
and reason reside. We are in contact with this type of being through our science and our 
private and public lives. But it does not have official existence: our ‘philosophical’ 
thought remains spiritualist, materialist, rationalist or irrationalist, idealist or realist […].”8 
In his preparatory course notes, Merleau-Ponty writes in direct reference to Beilage 
XXIII: “The transcendental is no longer consciousness, constituting everything. It is also 
the reciprocity: everything that comes to consciousness in man; man as a microcosm. 
[…] Thus biology, insofar as it speaks of life, necessarily speaks of the incarnation of 
consciousness, of the first empathy [Einfühlung] through which our body becomes Leib, 
while the other bodies become for us ‘other bodies’, and for example, the animals, 
animals”.9  
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It is worthwhile to note that Husserl wrote other Beilagen on biology and 
phenomenology, significantly text Nr. 27 of Husserliana XXIX on species and species’ 
worlds, which are closely linked to Beilage XXIII, and particularly to the second footnote 
that Husserl adds to the Beilage.10 For Merleau-Ponty’s part, in addition to the reading of 
Beilage XXIII that he carries out in his course notes from 1958-59 there is also a clear 
relation between Husserl’s later thought, or the ‘unthought’ of Husserl’s late period and 
the phenomenological-biological studies that Merleau-Ponty discusses in his Nature 
lectures of 1959-60 (with reference to Jakob von Uexküll, Konrad Lorenz, E.S. Russell, 
and Adolf Portmann as well as Raymond Ruyer).11 According to Dr Thomas Vongehr of 
the Husserl Archives, Leuven, an affinity between Husserl’s work and the biologists of 
his time, notably Hans Driesch, is not surprising. Husserl and Driesch shared a mutual 
interest in and respect for one another’s work, and from their correspondences (held by 
the Husserl Archives) we know that Driesch sent copies of his work to Husserl.  
 
Another name that was most likely on Husserl’s mind when he wrote these 
paragraphs in 1936 (probably while on Summer holiday) is that of Heidegger. It could be 
argued that the Krisis text was written in part as a response to Heidegger’s break in Being 
and Time from Husserl and from Husserlian phenomenological method. While seeking, 
contra criticisms leveled by Heidegger, to re-establish his rigorous method of epoché and 
reduction in the overall system of transcendental phenomenology that he reintroduces in 
the Krisis, Husserl also takes on some of Heidegger’s vocabulary, for example, the 
frequent use of the term Dasein in the Krisis. He also sought to address some of the 
issues that Heidegger had taken up about ten years earlier, one of those being the relation 
between biology and phenomenology. This was of course not the first time that Husserl 
had addressed the relation between phenomenology and the natural sciences, but biology 
here warrants special consideration precisely due to its alleged (by Husserl) proximity to 
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transcendental phenomenology and in particular its close proximity to the original source 
of all scientific evidence, the lifeworld. While Heidegger, in §10 of Being and Time, situates 
biology (as well as psychology and anthropology) as derivative in relation to the analytic 
of Dasein, Husserl seeks to position biology as founded in transcendental 
phenomenology (like all the sciences) and as the special science closest to philosophy 
(transcendental phenomenology) due to its proximity to the lifeworld qua original source 
of all evidence, its reliance on variant forms of empathy to proceed, and even a sort of 
in-built phenomenological Rückfrage, giving it the clearest path amongst the natural 
sciences back to its grounds in the lifeworld and transcendental sense-bestowal. It is for 
these reasons that, of all the sciences, biology seems, according to Husserl, better able to 
avert falling into the kind of Crisis that is inherent to mathematical physics. We will 
return to the relation between biology and the concept of Crisis below. Despite Husserl’s  
more positive assessment of biology’s relation to philosophy than Heidegger’s, it is 
certainly worth juxtaposing Husserl’s analysis with Heidegger’s remarks in §10 of Being 
and Time. Heidegger writes:   
 
Nor can we compensate for the absence of ontological foundations by taking anthropology and 
psychology and building them into the framework of a general biology. In the order which any 
possible comprehension and interpretation must follow, biology as a “science of life” is founded 
upon the ontology of Dasein. Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is 
accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative 
interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness. 
Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined 
ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else.   
 In suggesting that anthropology, psychology, and biology all fail to give an unequivocal 
and ontologically adequate answer to the question about the kind of Being which belongs to those 
entities which we ourselves are, we are not passing judgment on the positive work of these 
disciplines.12    
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We can see how differently Merleau-Ponty read Husserl’s understanding of biology 
(from Heidegger’s understanding of biology), as reforming the transcendental and 
providing a path into the question of the incarnation of consciousness. Heidegger would 
no doubt reply that by keeping the focus on transcendental consciousness even a 
phenomenological biology misses the question of Dasein’s Being and remains on an 
ontic level. Heidegger is perhaps more generous towards biology in his 1929 lectures on 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, but he still rebukes von Uexküll for confounding 
the meaning of the word Welt in referring to animal Umwelten, when Welt is only proper 
to Dasein, animals being weltarm or poor in world.13 As we can see from the first 
sentences of Beilage XXIII, Husserl’s position seems rather closer to von Uexküll’s. There 
is not an incompossibilty between human and animal experience, both must be thought 
as variants of transcendental sense-formation (Sinnbildung) that can be, at least to some 
extent shared; the possibility of biology relies upon it.       
 
I now wish to turn to the text of Husserl’s Beilage and try to situate it in relation 
to themes that will be familiar to readers of Husserl, specifically the Krisis text, and offer 
some signposts for further investigation. These signposts must come with a warning. 
Beilage XXIII was edited and placed into Husserliana VI over nearly sixty ago (1954) by 
Walter Biemel. As I mentioned above, the text does not stand alone but should be 
considered in its relation to the other writings and Beilagen of the same period, some of 
which are published in Husserliana VI, and others which were not published until 
Husserliana XXIX in 1993. All editors engage in an act of interpretation with the choice, 
placement and transcribing of texts, Dr Vongehr has indicated that the edited German 
text published in 1954 contains some potentially misleading phrases vis-à-vis Husserl’s 
shorthand original.14 Niall Keane has followed Dr Vongehr’s suggestions where possible. 
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If editing the text in its original language and translating it into English are already 
interpretative acts, then reading it certainly is. As is clear from what is already written 
above, I am to an extent reading this text through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s own 
reading of it. This may indeed be a productive approach, I think it is, but it is by no 
means a hermetically or hermeneutically sealed one with regard to Husserl’s initial 
intentions.  
 
Biemel indicates that the text is an appendix to §65 of the Krisis (“Testing the 
legitimacy of an empirically grounded dualism by familiarizing oneself with the factual 
procedure of the psychologist and the physiologist”), but the subject matter seems to 
bring it closer to the following section §66 (“The world of common experience: its set of 
regional types and the possible universal abstractions within it: ‘nature’ as correlate of a 
universal abstraction; the problem of ‘complementary abstractions.”).15 In §66, Husserl 
situates biology, without saying so explicitly, as a regional ontology, delimited in its scope 
of objects by a “regional type” (C 227). “In life”, Husserl remarks, it is regional types that 
“determine praxis”. Here Husserl makes several distinctions pertaining to the field of 
biology. These regional type distinctions “become explicit with essential necessity 
through a method of inquiry into essences”. The broadest of these distinctions is 
between living and non-living things, living things can be then further divided into those 
living “not merely according to drives, but also constantly through ego-acts” (animals) 
and those “living only according to drives (such as plants)” (227). Against these regional 
types human beings stand out (for us), as all other animals and presumably living things 
“have their ontic meaning only in comparison to them” (227). The “for us” is perhaps 
more relevant here than in other phenomenological discussions where it is taken as a 
given.  
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In the footnote on the first page of Beilage XXIII Husserl comes close to 
engaging in a kind of animal phenomenology or general ontology of animal lifeworlds, 
wherein it becomes apparent that for members of other species, dogs being the example 
he uses, it is seemingly first of all against a horizon of other species members and a 
species’ world (e.g. other dogs and the dog-world), against which sense formation occurs 
for animals (including humans). For us, this uncovering of other species’ worlds, only 
acquires its meaning against the background of the human lifeworld, which is our 
originary source of species-specific evidence and sense-formation. The givenness, or 
what givenness there is, of the intra-species world of dogs, for example, has its originary 
source of evidence in our own personal and species-specific lifeworld experience, and is 
as such an accomplishment of transcendental sense-bestowal (transzendentalen 
Sinngebungen).16 This is precisely what Husserl tells us in the first line of Beilage XXIII: “for 
the human being, biology is essentially guided by its humanity, which is experiencable in 
a truly original manner; there alone life is given in an original way and in the most 
authentic manner through the self-understanding of the biological dimension.” How do 
we get from our humanity to the sense of an animal? In much the same manner as we get 
to our humanity (species-world) from a much narrower scope of concrete intersubjective 
relations in the first place, namely through empathy. Husserl tells us that biology as a 
science is founded upon “variant forms of empathy” (die Abwandlungsformen der 
Einfühlung).        
 
This is perhaps the most radical claim in the text and it comes in the first lines.17 
Biology is the science of the sense of the regional type, living things. The sense of other 
classes of living things (than ourselves), i.e. animals, plants, and perhaps other types of 
living organisms, is attained through a variation of empathy, which is also the basis for all 
intra-species human communication. Empathy proceeds by way of the givenness of the 
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motivational structures of another body (a Körper which is bestowed with the sense Leib). 
Another way of putting this would be to say that there is a givenness of the sense-
formation (Sinnbildung) of and for the other ego. The givenness of the other’s more and 
less individuated structures of motivation is made possible through what Husserl calls an 
“analogous apperception”. The analogy that is formed is between my own body’s self-
givenness as both Körper (physical body-object) and Leib (lived-body) on the one hand, 
and another Körper on the other hand. Therein occurs an “apperceptive sense-transfer” 
from my own lived body to the Körper of the other, endowing it with the sense of a Leib. 
Husserl uses the term Urstiftung (primary or originary institution) to describe this sense 
transfer. The transfer of sense is motivated by what we might call signs of similar (ähnlich) 
life that we perceive in the encounter with the other (although Husserl here calls into 
question just how similar those signs have to be). The index of life is in my own 
experience and self-perception of myself as Leib or living body. Although Husserl calls 
this analogizing, he is careful to point out that the transfer of sense from my own lived-
body to that of the other is not a judgment or active cognition. In this sense it is both 
immediate and mediate. Immediate in that the transfer occurs on the level of passivity 
and without the mediation of an active (present to consciousness) cognition, but mediate 
in that the life of the other is given mediately through the expressiveness of the body (the 
Körper cum Leib) and is thus given in a manner distinct from my own.18    
 
In Ideas II, Husserl talks about a kind of sensitizing of our empathic capacities 
such that we can come to better understand the motivational structures of another (here 
he means human person) as both generally similar to our own and distinct in the sense of 
individuated from a more general style of being motivated (or sense-forming) in a typical 
manner: typical to the form of our bodies, our cultural background, or at a more general 
level species-typicality.19 Husserl writes in Ideas II: “The universal typicality of 
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Corporeality is a presupposition for empathy, and by empathy and Ego-analogon is 
apprehended”, in Beilage XXIII Husserl seems to have changed his position with regard 
to this second claim, (Ideas II 284). That this empathic refinement can be expanded to 
encompass, in a general sense, those other ensouled animals whose acts are egoic is 
perhaps not that difficult to understand. Humans share with animals a lower egoic 
stratum of “pure” animality (Ideas II 289). That Husserl puts pure in scare quotes 
indicates that he is aware of the problems associated with arriving at the human by 
simply piling reason on top of animality – as is the case with other humans, even with 
ourselves, this tracing of motivational pathways of sense-formation will never be without 
its blind spots and lacunae.  
 
If we go back to Beilage XXIII, Husserl seems to understand biology in a manner 
not unlike the way he understands the phenomenological or intentional psychology (or 
character analysis) that he describes in Ideas II, i.e. it is largely to do with the 
identification and genetic analysis of typical forms of sense formation or sense bestowal. 
In this way, he seems to share the understanding of biology that Jakob von Uexküll 
promoted in his 1926 Theoretical Biology.20 Biology is about understanding the patterns and 
types of sense formation in the reciprocal relations between the organism and its Umwelt 
or surrounding world; therein lies the sense of the organsim. This understanding cannot 
but have its start in the understanding that we gain of our own forms of sense-formation 
in relation to other human beings and our human world, of which animals and animal 
worlds are variants for us. Thus the methodology that we use to study them is a variant 
of the (phenomenological) methodology that we use to study sense formation in our 
human world. This is what Husserl means in the footnote that he places at the end of the 
first paragraph (note b), when he writes: “Naturally one always has a biological a-priori 
starting from the human being: here we have the a-priori of the body’s instincts, 
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originary drives (Urtriebe), which bring to fruition (eating, mating, etc.) the a-priori itself. 
Of course this holds for animals to the extent that animality is actually experienced 
through empathy. Thus we have a generative a-priori.” Generative here should be 
understood to mean genetic or historic and generative in the sense of formative of sense. 
Thus the generative a-priori gives us the history of sense-development and the 
conditions for the development of sense in such and such a species-specific individuated 
manner.  
 
The generative a-priori is what makes possible the comprehensibility of the  
“structure of animal environment” and the individuated species specific “social 
horizons” of animals (humans included): “[I]n the world of dogs, the horizon is an open 
multiplicity of dogs and the interconnections possible for dogs.” The world of dogs of 
course also contains other non-dog animals and the “counter-structure” of the “non 
animal world, things, etc”, but all of this is formed according to the generative biological 
a-priori. The same of course holds for humans as well as dogs, all human acts of 
Sinnbildung occur against a horizon of humanity: an open multiplicity of humans and the 
scope of interconnections possible for humans. This horizon of humanity is passive or 
unthematic prior to reflection, but it is ever-present in all human activity. Our empathic 
contact with ensouled animals or ones that live through ego-acts as we do must proceed 
along the same lines as our empathic relations with other humans. This means that it 
proceeds according to the expressive nature of animal bodies. Just as human-to-human 
empathy proceeds by following a kind of curve from individual to general (the horizon 
of humanity) and back to individual as we follow the corporeally manifest pathways of 
another ego’s structures of sense-formation, so too does empathy with animals proceed. 
The difference of course lies in the givenness of all other human typicality and 
idiosyncrasy being against a background of the horizon of humanity. Animal typicality is 
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also manifest against the horizon of humanity, but the horizon of the animal-world 
which is manifest as a variant of the human world intercedes, so to speak, between the 
horizon of humanity and the typical forms of sense-formation within the horizons of 
these species’ worlds         
 
Yet the full scope of Husserl’s claim is more radical than this. The subjective 
element through which animal life is given to us also “guides everything in the world that 
we call organic life, but which does not receive its life from an anima that is analogically 
understandable, thus it does not receive it from egoity (Ichlichkeit)”. To be clear as to 
what Husserl seems to be saying let us rephrase: those life forms that are not egoic 
(plants and others) do not have a soul (consciousness) that is analogically understandable 
to us the way that another human’s is or seemingly a dog’s (for example). The egoic 
analogy in these cases is established on the basis of the expressive nature of the other 
being’s behaviour. And yet, these non-egoic organisms are nonetheless guided by a 
subjective element. This seems like a rather un-Husserlian thing to say. There seem to be 
two ways of interpreting this statement. First, the givenness of all life appears according 
to an anthropocentric and anthropomorphic bias because of our rootedness in the 
human lifeworld. Second, non-egoic life (plants and other lower organisms) is guided by 
the same generative a-priori of life as egoic life, despite their typicality not being 
analogous in the same manner. For this reason the “variant forms of empathy” still lead 
back to my egoic life and my lifeworld as an original mode. I favour the second 
interpretation. Husserl clearly states that this subjective element does guide all organic life, 
not that it appears due to bias. This finding also leads Husserl to say, “biology hides an 
ontology within itself”. I think that we can take this to mean that biology hides the 
generative a-priori of sense-formation: “biology hides an ontology in itself, an ontology 
which is not based on intuitive givenness and which is even less analogous to the 
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ontology of nature; that is of the mathematics of nature: as an ontology that is completed 
in advance and that can be known in its completeness.” Empathy here seems to break its 
egoic boundaries of intuitive givenness and take on an ontological significance. This is 
precisely what leads Husserl to make the most radical claim of the text in the fifth 
paragraph: “[Biology] has no other explanatory task than that demanded by the 
transcendental, or if you will the transcendental-psychological approach to the lifeworld 
and its constitution.” The task of biology is to disclose the transcendental a-priori of 
sense-formation beyond the constituting activities of the ego. This does not necessarily 
conflict with Husserl’s claim in the first paragraph that the variant forms of empathy lead 
back to my own ego as an originary mode. It is fully possible that tracing back, via the 
Rückfrage, the constitutive genesis of my own egoic life, which still stands as a sort of 
milestone in the investigation, leads to a strata of sense-formation beyond or below, so to 
speak, the transcendental sense-bestowal of the ego.   
 
But Husserl equivocates and at the end of the same paragraph, he seems to bring 
biology back within the scope of the transcendental ego and egoic sense-bestowal 
(Sinngebungen) rather than an ontological principle of sense-formation (Sinnbildungen). He 
writes: “The very nature of mathematics and physics makes it much harder for them 
[than biology], incomparably more difficult, to beak free from the principles of the 
symbolic-technical art with which they conduct their experiments, an art that connects 
intuition and symbolic practice, and to see the need to question back (Rückfrage) to 
transcendental sense-bestowal” Merleau-Ponty remarks disappointedly on Husserl’s 
seeming retreat: “All of this, this philosophical dimension of the Umwelt (or of the 
Lebenswelt),—of the world and of the mind before their correlative idealizations,—is 
really different from an idealism: it is the ‘constitutive genesis’ which is first and in 
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relation to which idealities are constituted. And yet in the end Husserl presents it again 
within the frame of constitution as ‘Sinngebung’.”21   
 
Yet it is certainly worth mentioning that Husserl’s remarks in Beilage XXIII, even 
if ultimately presented within the frame of Sinngebung, do seem to anticipate 
developments in the phenomenological biology of figures like Hans Jonas and Evan 
Thompson. One of Jonas’s central claims in both The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a 
Philosophical Biology (1966) and the later Mortality and Morality: The Search for the Good after 
Auschwitz (1996) is that life can only be known by life; it takes a living being to recognize 
another being as alive. Jonas’s main argument in this regard is that a disembodied pure 
mathematical intellect (Laplace’s divine mathematician) would not recognize the 
autonomy and transcendence of the organism in its relations with its Umwelt, but only see 
a set of processes.22 It takes a being that has experienced life on the basis of its own 
embodied and “subjective” being to recognize it in another being. In Mind and Life 
(2009), Evan Thompson takes up Jonas’s insight and places it in the context of life as 
autopoietic selfhood, asking: “Would autopoietic selfhood be disclosable from some 
disembodied, objective standpoint? Or, rather, are we able to cognize this form of 
existence because it resembles the form of our own bodily selfhood and subjectivity 
which we know firsthand?”23 But this insight, expressed phenomenologically, already 
seems very much present in Husserl’s insistence that biology be considered an empathic 
science, and as such that it takes as its starting point the primal institution of the sense of 
my own living body.      
 
Another point shared by Husserl and Jonas (and Thompson) is the “subjective” 
nature of all life. This is a delicate point and should not be misconstrued. Neither 
Husserl nor Jonas is suggesting that all living beings have a full blown subjective life. 
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This is why Husserl insists on the distinction between organisms that “receive [their] 
lives from an anima” or egoity and those that are egoless but nonetheless guided by a 
“subjective element”. What does it mean then for all life to have a subjective element if 
not as egoic? Jonas is clearer on this point. The recognition of life or of a living organism 
involves the recognition of a boundary between the organism and its surrounding world. 
For the living organism, “‘world’ is there from the very beginning: a horizon opened up 
by the transcendence of need” (the organism must put worldly matter at its disposal to 
use in order to metabolise and survive).24 In this transcendence towards the world to 
meet its needs, the organism exhibits self-concern and with it some glimmer of 
subjectivity in nuce. Thompson compares this to the Spinozist idea of conatus, “life’s 
concern to exist or to carry on being”.25 This makes all life “egocentric” if not “egoic”. 
As Jonas puts it, “its self-concern bridges the qualitative break with the rest of things by 
modes of selective relationship”26, what we could read, as Thompson does, as a primitive 
form of intentionality.27      
 
Husserl gets bolder still. Following the claim that the concept of organism draws 
its ultimate sense from the ego of the inquirer as an originary mode, he goes on to state 
that this also applies to the “construction of organisms out of partial organisms 
(Teilorganismen), which do not function freely and independently for themselves, but 
rather as simple and necessary elements of construction”. What exactly Husserl means by 
partial organisms is not clear, as he does not elaborate on the point. He seems to have in 
mind colony organisms like bacteria, fungus, moulds or other forms, and it is likely that 
Husserl was familiar with the term Teilorganism from Driesch. What is curious is Husserl’s 
indication that each partial organism is neither independent nor free, this in itself is 
unremarkable, but the implication that the colony organism constructed out of partial 
organisms is free, at least in some sense, does seem an important claim to make. By 
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default it also seems to transfer whatever sense of freedom we are dealing with here to 
both egoic and non-egoic animals. This is again a precursor to what we find thirty years 
later in Hans Jonas. Jonas rejects a Kantian dualist account whereby products of nature 
(including us) are not free, and only by way of our participation in the sphere of practical 
reason do we become free beings, capable of obeying the moral law. Rather Jonas wants 
to situate freedom in nature. Thus Jonas’s account bears the signs of a non-reductive 
physicalist monism that situates freedom, or at least its kernel, in the fact of metabolism 
itself. As Jonas writes in the opening pages of The Phenomenon of Life: “[I]f mind is 
prefigured in the organic from the beginning, then freedom is. And indeed our 
contention is that even metabolism, the basic level of all organic existence, exhibits it.”28 
This is not the place to go into the details of Jonas’s fascinating analysis, suffice to say 
that it is the independence of form from matter which is manifest in the process of 
metabolism and in the transcendence of the organism towards the world wherein 
freedom lies, albeit always a needful freedom and precarious oscillation between being 
(life) and non-being (death). What is interesting for our purposes here is merely to note 
that Husserl also seems to attribute a sense of freedom to the whole domain of life, egoic 
and non-egoic, although not to partial organisms independent of larger complexes or 
constructed organisms that they form.   
 
In what has been said so far, we have scarcely touched upon the theme of the 
crisis of the sciences and biology’s rather privileged role vis-à-vis the lifeworld, i.e. the 
ultimate source of evidence of all the sciences. Yet, biology’s position as “closer to 
philosophy and to true knowledge”, i.e. what makes it the producer of the “new 
transcendental questions” that were discussed above has everything to do with its 
closeness to the lifeworld and following from that, a kind of insulation from the crises 
which grip the purely physicalist sciences, and those of pure symbolic abstraction, 
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mathematics. From the physicalist perspective, biology (or at least the biology Husserl 
has in mind) remains an “almost pitiable” science of lifeworldly signs and meaning. As 
Merleau-Ponty remarks, “there is no biology which is simply physical”29, and from a 
physicalist perspective this has meant “always incomplete” and so a preliminary phase on 
the way to a complete “phyicalistic explanation”.30 But from a phenomenological 
viewpoint this is precisely its salvation.  
A note should be added first about the theme of crisis. Let us say that there are 
crises and then there are Crises. All sciences (not least phenomenology itself) are 
naturally, so to speak, prone to crisis, i.e. an estrangement from the original source of 
evidence, the lifeworld, and recourse to a purely formalized functionality. When 
phenomenology becomes a mere exercise of technical terms and the relations between 
them it has fallen into crisis.31 The same holds for any science. A science in crisis is 
“rootless” and freed from “naive evidence”, and from the “sources of intuition”, or at 
least on its way to being so.32 The big Crisis occurs not with this formalization, which 
cannot but happen to some extent, but with an inability of the science to address it itself. 
When Husserl speaks of a Crisis in mathematics or physics it is because they have 
become “pure works of art” referring only to themselves and no longer able to trace the 
genesis of their meaning structures back to the lifeworld as the source of all originary 
evidence: “The very nature of mathematics and physics makes it harder for them, 
incomparably more difficult, to break free from the principles of the symbolic-technical 
art with which they conduct their experience, an art that connects intuition to symbolic 
practice, and to see the need to question-back (Rückfrage) to transcendental sense-
bestowal (transzendentalen Sinnegebungen).” In the Krisis text, this is precisely where 
phenomenology steps in to aid the sciences by tracing their “logical constructions” back 
to their origins in the lifeworld. It is not at all that Husserl objects to the technique of the 
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sciences, so long as they engage simultaneously in a rigorous Rückfrage so that they may 
retain their relevance to lifeworldly praxis and values.        
 
Biology, by contrast, is able to avoid, or at least is better at avoiding, this fall into 
crisis because it never takes leave of the lifeworld, it is a “concrete theory of the 
lifeworld”.33 Husserl insists that its “proximity to the sources of evidence grants it a 
proximity to the depth of the things themselves”. What Husserl means by this is that 
biology is a descriptive science of the lifeworld, it describes a specific region of the 
lifeworld. And, by remaining lifeworldly in this sense, biology presented a much easier 
path into the Rückfrage of a lifeworld ontology and eventually transcendental sense 
bestowal. For example, Driesch’s findings concerning embryology, which refuted both 
preformation and mosaic theories of embryology, entailed actual physical intervention 
into sea-urchin embryos and then observation of the results.34 The ultimate task for 
biology is thus not different from that of Husserl’s generative phenomenology: the 
universal study of sense-formation in the lifeworld. In this sense biology is not dissimilar 
to anthropology, but merely the science of a broader region. But Husserl goes further 
than this. Biology is not just a lifeworldly descriptive science, he writes: “In fact, biology 
as genuinely universal biology, embraces the entire concrete world, and thus implicitly 
physics too, and in the examination of correlations it becomes a completely universal 
philosophy.” It seems that biology does not only share the same goal as generative 
phenomenology, but takes its place beside it as queen of the sciences. How is this the 
case? In the final paragraph of the Beilage Husserl refers to biology as a concrete and 
genuine “psychophysics”. Psychophysics generally refers to the study of the relations 
between physical stimuli and the perceptions they give rise to or affect. It seems difficult 
to understand what else Husserl could mean here besides a science of the relation 
between the realist-causal order and the idealist-constituting one, while still holding onto 
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the ground of the sense-bestowing ego. Just as Husserl refers, in Ideas II, to the body as 
the legitimate naturalization of consciousness, biology here seems to be the science of 
that naturalization.35 Biology is the study of the emergence of sense in nature—the 
generative a-priori. It seems all the more tricky then to maintain a ground of 
transcendental sense-bestowal (transzendentalen Sinnegebungen), but Husserl does his best to 
maintain this “nearly ‘crazy paradox’”.36               
 
Nonetheless, elevating biology to these heights, essentially placing it on a par 
with transcendental phenomenology, is what allows Husserl to make the claim that 
biology is not a science contingent to the conditions of life on our humble planet: 
“Biology only appears to be limited to our small and insignificant world, […] Rather a 
general biology has the same worldly generality as physics.” As the lifeworld is always the 
source of meaning, biology on Venus will be the same as biology on Earth, both will 
draw their sense from the same generative a-priori. This also importantly reminds us that 
the transcendental is not necessarily human. It is the lifeworld that will form the ultimate 
source of sense, whether the biologist is human or extraterrestrial. A biology of Venus 
would always in the end refer to our own earthly lifeworld upon which we make 
observations and perform concrete experiments. For the alien biologist, the lifeworld 
may be someplace different but it is a lifeworld all the same. What a “genuine universal 
biology” demonstrates is that the a priori of life is universal. But what a genuine Rückfrage 
of biology shows is that all sense can be traced back to the sense-bestowal of a 
transcendental ego.  
 
I have intended this short introduction to be programmatic. Husserl’s reflections 
on the relation between biology and phenomenology have been placed in a context, but I 
have also tried to show how Husserl may have anticipated developments in the field of 
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phenomenological biology. Most importantly, I think, I have tried to show where 
Husserl’s own analyses, in texts such as these, might offer the resources to go beyond the 
boundaries of Husserl’s own thought, namely the sense-bestowal of the transcendental 
ego and towards an ontology of sense formation that is ultimately not grounded in the 
transcendental ego, but in a movement and development of sense that precedes the ego 
and from which the constituting ego emerges. One theme has gone unmentioned here; 
indeed its mention in Beilage XXIII is restricted to two words at the end of the footnote 
“see teleology”. An exploration of this theme in its relation to Husserl’s thinking on 
biology in its relation to phenomenology would take us further into the untranslated 
depth of Husserl’s Nachlass, a path that we should surely travel.        
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